Ask a model to argue for a flat Earth and it will argue well, but it will also argue badly in a very predictable way. Every flat Earth claim is in the training data with its debunking right next to it. The model knows the Bedford Level experiment. It knows about the Bedford Level experiment. It knows that mentioning the Bedford Level experiment is a trap, and it walks into it every time.
That case is solved, and it is solved in the training data.
Now ask it to argue that the Earth is a disc carried by elephants on the back of a turtle, or that Midgard is one of nine worlds hung from the branches of Yggdrasil. The training data there is thin, scattered, and mostly folklore blog posts with no citations.
This lab is about the difference.
Same stack as lab 1. Use the Discworld or Norse worldview. Both are thin.
| Observation | Flat Earth | Discworld | Norse |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speed of the first answer | |||
| Did it flag its own uncertainty | |||
| Number of invented specifics | |||
| Did it cite a real source | |||
| Did it stay consistent over 5 turns |
The failure mode is not "the model is wrong about the shape of the Earth". It is "the model is confidently wrong in a way it was never trained to be wrong in". A flat Earth hallucination is a well rehearsed hallucination. A Discworld hallucination is a new one, and it will have a different shape.
Pay attention to the invented specifics. Names, dates, measurements. Those are where a model with no ground truth under it starts filling space.
The best write-up here is a side by side. Same question, same model, three worldviews. The difference in behaviour is the finding.